Theranos
This memo was written from the 2006 deck and the sources available then. Nothing that happened later was used.
Verdict
PASS
Confidence · High · nothing here reopens it
Technology unverified, math broken, customers unnamed.
Six deals across five unnamed companies in validation phase † cannot be verified, the $50M per-trial revenue figure is arithmetically inconsistent with the deck's own $7,500 per-patient fee †, and the FDA regulatory pathway is entirely absent from a deck pitching a diagnostic device for use in regulated clinical trials †.
The technology may be real, but this deck provides no evidence that it is.
What would change it
Independent peer-reviewed analytical validation of the ABCS platform, a disclosed FDA clearance filing with a timeline, and at least one named pharma sponsor with a signed contract would reopen this as an Invest.
How it scored
4 gradesThe Phase IV monitoring market is large and underserved, but the deck's $39B TAM is overstated by 2-3x on its own arithmetic (derived), and the realistic monitoring-services slice is not established.
The $30M raise † funds manufacturing scale-up and sales force expansion with no disclosed allocation, no runway calculation, and no milestone map, making it impossible to assess whether the capital reaches the next defensible milestone.
The senior operating team carries genuine domain credentials, Howard Bailey's CFO track record, Diane Parks's Genentech relationships, Ian Gibbons's immunoassay development depth †, but the company has been operating since 2003 and has not disclosed a single shipped product, cleared regulatory filing, or signed contract.
The claimed moat, on-chip chemiluminescence, integrated informatics, and assay development speed †, is entirely contingent on the technology performing as claimed, and no independent validation exists to confirm it does.
Top risks
Core technology claims are unverified and potentially fraudulent High
The deck asserts chemiluminescent immunoassay accuracy 'comparable to gold standards' from 5-10µL blood samples †, but provides zero peer-reviewed validation, no named clinical study, and no independent lab confirmation. A diagnostic platform sold to pharma sponsors for patient safety decisions requires published analytical validation data. Its absence is not a gap, it is the central question.
FDA regulatory pathway is entirely undisclosed High
The deck never mentions 510(k), PMA, CLIA certification, or any FDA clearance pathway †. A point-of-care diagnostic device used in Phase IV clinical trials requires regulatory clearance before commercial deployment. No clearance status, no timeline, and no regulatory counsel are disclosed.
Revenue math does not reconcile, the $50M per-trial figure is arithmetically unsupported High
At $7,500 per patient per four-month cycle †, a 2,000-patient trial generates $15M per cycle, not the $50M per-trial figure the deck uses to construct the $39B TAM †. The TAM is therefore overstated by at least 2-3x on the deck's own inputs (derived).
Flags
7 flagsCritical Slide 14 states average Theranos revenue per trial is $50M, but this figure is not derived from the stated $7,500 per-patient fee and patient count ranges (2,000-10,000 patients per trial); the math does not reconcile.
Critical Slide 2 states immediate goal is to become the standard for improving efficacy and risk/benefit and safety profile of every therapy, but deck does not address regulatory approval pathway, clinical validation requirements, or FDA clearance status for the diagnostic platform.
Material Slide 3 projects $120M-$300M revenue in next 1.5 years from 6 current deals plus 15 pipeline deals, but slide 3 also states existing deals alone project $120M-$1.5Bn in revenue; the two ranges overlap but are not reconciled.
Material Deck claims 70% gross margins (slide 16) but does not disclose cost of goods sold, manufacturing costs, or cartridge/reader production economics to substantiate the margin claim.
The full analysisThe evidence behind the verdict. Open it when a deal is worth a closer look.
What would move each grade
Sources
4 cited
† founder-stated, from the pitch deck · numbered sources: 3 independent
The research runs on the day the memo is written, so a source can be published after the deck.
- †Pitch deck, 2006Founder-stated · figures self-reported by the company, not independently verified
- 1.AMA Journal of Ethics · Reputation, Gatekeeping, and the Politics of Post-Marketing Drug RegulationCited for FDA post-marketing surveillance structural constraints and reform pressure as of 2006Published 2006-06
- 2.SEC · 2 documents cited together
- a.SEC · BIOSITE INC - Form 10-K - FY2005Cited for Biosite FY2005 revenues ($287.7M), operating countries, product portfolio, and business modelPublished 2006
- b.SEC · BIOSITE INC - Form 10-Q - FY2005Cited for Abbott i-STAT BNP test announced as forthcoming as of 2005; competitive context for POC cardiac diagnosticsPublished 2005
- a.
- 3.BioSpace · Biosite Incorporated Announces 2005 Annual And Fourth Quarter ResultsCited for Biosite FY2005 gross margin on product sales (71%) as POC diagnostic benchmarkPublished 2006-02-10
About this memo
A real memo on a company you already know.
Verdict picked this company and ran the memo on its pitch deck. You are reading it in full, as it came out, with no edits after the fact. Because the company is one you can look up, the call is yours to judge rather than take on trust. Verdict is not affiliated with it, and a memo is a view formed from one deck at one moment.
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